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Abstract
We present a multi-agent framework for the formal verification of
component-based systems after changes such as addition, removal and
modification of components. The core of our approach is an Agent Ver-
ification Engine (AVE) that constructs evolvable Belief-Desire-Intention
(BDI) agents to coordinate and plan the re-verification of component mod-
els after system changes. The engine provides BDI-agents with existing
techniques for the compositional verification of component-based systems.
We illustrate this integration for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
constraint analysis and demonstrate our framework on requirements aris-
ing from industrial control systems.
1 Introduction
Component-based software systems are increasingly common, and include business-
and safety-critical systems from domains as diverse as healthcare, transportation
and finance [1]. Critical systems are expected to be reliable since downtime of-
ten results in a decrease of revenue or unavailability of essential services. Formal
verification techniques such as model checking or automated theorem proving
can be used to provide irrefutable proof of a system’s compliance to requirements
by analysing mathematical models of the system against properties derived from
the requirements.
Compositional verification techniques [2, 3] decompose the verification of a
large, monolithic system model into a sequence of small verification steps that
are applied to the components of the system, thus enabling formal verification
of much larger systems. However, these approaches do not take into account the
system’s runtime environment, where components are frequently added and up-
dated or may unexpectedly fail. Agent-based modelling is widely used in safety
or business critical systems as a means for intelligent adaptation in response to
planned and unplanned runtime changes. This approach is well suited to adapt
large scale cloud deployed systems [4, 5] and industrial manufacturing applica-
tions [6, 7] whose compliance to quality-of-service (QoS) requirements must be
maintained during runtime.
In this paper, we introduce the Agent Verification Engine (AVE) which con-
structs agents to perceive, react, and adapt to runtime changes of a component-
1
based system. These agents are based on the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI)
architecture [8], in which agents operate in terms of motivation and beliefs.
BDI-agents have a formal basis in logic to formalize an agent’s decision making
in an attempt to achieve its goals [9]. BDI-agents are constructed by AVE ac-
cording to the system’s architecture and observe components to detect changes.
When changes happen, agents perform verification tasks to verify the model of
components against properties to determine compliance with system require-
ments.
The main contributions of this paper are (a) an algebraic specification of an
agent verification engine based on BDI-agents, (b) the integration of a satisfia-
bility modulo theories (SMT) solver to provide agents with verification capabil-
ities, (c) an application of the engine to a real-world industrial control software
case study, and (d) a prototype implementation of the agent verification engine
using Jason AgentSpeak [10].
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides key math-
ematical preliminaries. Section 3 formulates the agent verification engine al-
gebraically and describes evolvable BDI-agent plans. Section 4 integrates an
existing SMT-based compositional verification approach into the engine. Sec-
tion 5 applies the engine to analyse an industrial item sorting system. Section
6 shows the effectiveness and scalability of our approach. Section 7 discusses
related work and Section 8 presents concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Assuming readers to have basic understanding of universal algebra [11] and
BDI-agent architectures [8, 10], we define the following key tools and notations.
Signatures and Terms
A signature Σ consists of a sort s and a finite number of operation symbols
f : sn → s for n ≥ 0. Symbols of the form c → S are signature constants.
A signature Σ contains the sort Bool with constants true, false → Bool and
names the standard logical connectives ∧ and ¬. Operation symbols of the form
b : sn → Bool are Σ-predicates. Σ-terms are defined by the rules
t ::= c1 | . . . | cm | z | f1(t1, . . . , tm1) | . . . | fn(t1, . . . , tmn)
for constants c1, . . . , cm, variable z from the set Z, operation symbols f1, . . . , fn
and Σ-terms tij .
The AgentSpeak Language
AgentSpeak [8] is an agent-oriented programming based on logic programming
and the BDI architecture for autonomous agents. BDI-agents operate within
an environment and receive continuous input perceptions. Agents respond by
performing actions that affect the environment. The beliefs, desires and inten-
tions of an agent correspond with the agent’s informational, motivational and
decision making components that comprise its mental state.
Beliefs: An agent’s belief is constructed from predicate terms as follows. If
t = t1, . . . , tn is a tuple of Σ-terms then b(t) is a belief atom for the predicate
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Figure 1: Agent Verification Engine (AVE) workflow
symbol b. If b(t) and c(t) are belief atoms then ¬b(t), b(t) ∧ c(t) are beliefs.
Beliefs represent the information available to the agent and are stored in its
belief base B.
Goals: If g is a predicate symbol and t = t1, . . . , tn a tuple of Σ-terms then
!g(t) is an achievement goal an agent aims to achieve and ?g(t) is a test goal that
tests if g(t) is a true belief. Acquiring a new belief or goal creates a trigger event
within an agent. If b(t) is a belief atom then +b(t), −b(t) are triggering events
corresponding to the addition and removal of beliefs. Similarly, +!g(t), −!g(t)
and +?g(t),−?g(t) correspond to the addition and removal of achievement and
test goals, respectively.
3 Agent Verification Engine
This section algebraically specifies the Agent Verification Engine (AVE). The
engine’s workflow is depicted in Figure 1 and comprises the agent planner, that
reads an algebraic system specification S and requirements R, a set A of BDI-
agents constructed by the agent planner to verify components of S and an oracle
ω. The workflow has two phases. In the agent construction phase, the agent
planner constructs a set A = {αt1 , . . . , αtn} of BDI-agents for components
t1, . . . , tn of the system S. Each agent is constructed with a plan library to
determine compliance of its component with the requirements given by R. The
agent invokes an external oracle ω which represents a compositional verification
service to determine the component’s satisfaction of requirements. In the agent
runtime phase, an agent perceives localised component changes t′ in the runtime
environment and notifies the agent planner. The agent planner transforms S
by performing the corresponding term substitution S′ = S[t′/t] of the agent’s
component term t with the new component term t′ to obtain S′. The agent
planner uses t′ to update the agent’s beliefs and plan library.
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3.1 The Oracle
LetM be a set of component models,P a set of properties and V a set of values.
The oracle is an automated process that accepts as input a verification task
(m, g, a) from the set W =M ×P× [P → V ] and is modelled mathematically
by the total function ω : W → V such that
ω(m, g, a) = the value v obtained from the process (1)
of verifying property g on model m
under assumptions of a
for model m ∈M , g ∈P and v ∈ V and the map a : P → V of properties to
verification values. The oracle is programmed to always terminate, potentially
due to failure. If a failure occurs, then a special unverified value u is returned
by the service. We extend the set of values to include this element by setting
V = V ∪ {u}.
Our choice of notation in (1) generalises assume-guarantee [12, 13] model
checking approaches to include decomposition techniques used in formal analy-
sis of component-based systems. In assume-guarantee reasoning, a monolithic
model m is decomposed into smaller, more manageable models m1, . . . ,mq.
Each model mi is associated with a property ai ∈P, formalising requirements
of the component. Component-wise verification is performed in a sequence of
steps whereby the verification of property ai on model mi obtains a verification
value vi ∈ V . In symbols, we write mi, vi |= ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ q. We denote the list of
assumptions and verification results obtained by component-wise verification as
a. Using the assume-guarantee approach, the system requirements formalised
as the property g ∈ P for the monolithic model m has verification result v
under the assumptions a. In symbols, we write m, v |= g (m can be omitted if
clear from the context).
3.2 Agent Construction Phase
We give an algebraic specification of component-based systems and use their
inductive properties to derive the agent planner’s construction of the agent set
A .
Specifying Component-Based Systems
A component signature Σ is a finite set C of component sorts that represent parts
of a system and a set {f1, . . . , fn} of operations to be performed on components.
By choosing some basic components c1, . . . , cm, e.g. constants in Σ and applying
a sequence of operations, we form a component-based system as a high-level
syntactic component term S. The term defines the hierarchical structure of a
component-based system by expressing the sequence of operations carried out
in the construction of the system and specifies the order in which they are
applied. Let the set of all component terms over the signature Σ be denoted
as C(Σ). For example, the component term comp(c1, comp(c2, c3)) in C(Σ) is
formed from the composition of basic component c1 and the composition of
basic components c2 and c3, where comp : C(Σ)×C(Σ)→ C(Σ) is an operation
in Σ. The inductive properties of component terms are a natural data structure
for specifying BDI-agent verification plans.
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Each component c ∈ C(Σ) is associated with a model m ∈M and a property
g ∈P formulated from R.
Agent Plans for Basic Components
Let c be a basic component of the component signature Σ, m ∈M a component
model and g ∈ P a property. The agent planner constructs a BDI-agent αc
with initial beliefs
Bc = {model(m), property(g)} (2)
where the predicates model and property specify agent αc’s belief of the com-
ponent model m and property g. Initially, the agent has the achievement goal
!verify to determine the verification result v ∈ V of property g for model m.
We define the context expression
Ec = model(M) ∧ property(G) (3)
such that the agent holds sufficient information about its component’s model
and property for the verification plan constructed by the agent planner. This
plan has the form
+verify : Ec ←?model(M)∧?property(G)∧
ω(M,G, V ) ∧+result(V ). (4)
Since the initial belief base (2) of αc satisfies the plan’s context Ec, the agent’s
goal !verify triggers plan (4). The test goals ?model(M) and ?property(G) unify
the model m and property g with variables M and G respectively, according
to the agent’s beliefs (2). The agent αc performs the action ω(M,G, V ) and
invokes the oracle to compute v = ω(m, g, η), with the null function η : ∅ → ∅
specifying that no assumptions are required for the computation. The result v
is unified with variable V and +result(V ) adds the value to the belief base with
the predicate symbol result.
Agent Plans for Composite Components
We give an inductive definition of the plans for agent αt assigned to the compo-
nent term t = f(t1, . . . , tm) with sub-components t1, . . . , tm and the operation
symbol f ∈ Σ. The agent has beliefs of its component model m and property
g, and thus the initial belief base of αt is set as Bt = {model(m), property(g)},
similar to (2).
In general, the verification result m, v |= g of agent αt is dependent upon the
verification values obtained by agents At = {αt1 , . . . , αtm} for the sub-terms of
t. Agent αt therefore must communicate with each agent in At and construct
assumptions a :P → V to be supplied to the oracle. To coordinate with agents
αt1 , . . . , αtm , agent αt is constructed with the plan
+!queryagents : true← (5)
send(t1, givep,A1) ∧ · · · ∧ send(tm, givep,Am)
∧send(t1, givev, V1) ∧ · · · ∧ send(tm, givev, Vm)
which asks each sub-component agent αti to retrieve the verification task infor-
mation stored within its belief base. The properties a1, . . . , am in P and values
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v1, . . . , vm in V are unified with variables A1, . . . , Am and V1, . . . , Vm respec-
tively. They are used to construct the assumption function a : {a1, . . . , am} →
{v1, . . . , vm} such that
a(ai) = vi. (6)
To facilitate communication with αt, each agent αti is constructed with the
plan
+?givep : true← ?property(A) (7)
∧ send(t, propertyti(A)).
by the agent planner, which is triggered whenever its mental state is changed
to the test goal ?givep, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The plan body of (7) contains a special send action which enables transmis-
sion of messages between agents using the Knowledge Query and Manipulation
Language (KQML) [14] which expresses an agent’s intention for sending a mes-
sage. Agents send messages for two purposes: i) to change the receiver’s beliefs,
or ii) to change the receiver’s goals. In the plan body of (7), agent αti ’s property
belief is unified with the variable P and sent to agent αt, who receives the belief
and adds it to Bt. Similarly, the verification value obtained from the oracle ω
by αti is sent to αt by the plan
+?givev :true←?result(V ) ∧ send(t, resultti(V )). (8)
The goal ?result(V ) is complete only when αti completes its verification task
and resultti(V ) is added to its belief base.
For the composite component represented by the component term t with
sub-terms t1, . . . , tm, the context expression (3) is extended to
E′t = Et ∧ propertyt1(A1) ∧ · · · ∧ propertytm(Am) (9)
∧ resultt1(V1) ∧ · · · ∧ resulttm(Vm)
to ensure the values from agents αt1 , . . . , αtm have been received. The agent
planner formulates two plans so that agent αt can achieve its verification goal
!verify . The first plan is applicable whenever αt has not obtained values from
agents αt1 , . . . , αtm . In this context, the plan
+!verify : ¬E′t ← !queryagents ∧ !verify
comprises the achievement subgoal !queryagents which triggers plan (5) and
continues to attempt the achievement !verify . In the context of receiving values
from all sub-component agents, the plan invoked to achieve !verify is
+verify : E′t ←?model(M) ∧ ?property(G) (10)
∧ ?propertyt1(A1) ∧ · · · ∧ ?propertytm(Am)
∧ ?resultt1(V1) ∧ · · · ∧ ?resulttm(Vm)
∧ ω(M,G, V,A1, . . . , Am, V1, . . . , Vm)
∧ +result(V ).
comprising additional test goals unifying A1, . . . , Am and V1, . . . , Vm with prop-
erties and values from the verification tasks of agents αt1 , . . . , αtm . The proper-
ties and values construct the assumption function a defined in (6) used as input
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for action ω(M,G, V,A1, . . . , Am, V1, . . . , Vm), invoking the external oracle to
compute v = ω(m, g,a). The variable V is unified with the value v and stored
in the agent’s belief base with predicate symbol result.
3.3 Agent Runtime Phase
Runtime environments are dynamic and changes such as the addition, removal
and modification of components occur in rapid succession. In this section, we
specify plans enabling an agent to sense localised changes of the components
modelled by their verification task. When a component change occurs, the
agent is required to adapt and evolve its beliefs and behaviour during system
operation in order to maintain a verification task that correlates to the actual
state of the system. Formally, agent αt is constructed with the plan
+!detect : true← sense ∧ !detect. (11)
which executes the action sense to detect changes in the component t ∈ C(Σ).
Component change detection only occurs after αt achieves its initial verification
goal. We extend the agent’s verification plan by appending the achievement
goal !detect to the plan bodies listed in (4) and (10).
Agent Change Perceptions
The agent action sense notifies the engine that the system represented alge-
braically by the component term S is updated according to a component change
sensed in the runtime environment. Mathematically, a component change is
modelled as a component term t′ ∈ C(Σ) with an associated model m′ ∈ M
and property g′ ∈ P. When a component change occurs, the engine first up-
dates S and associated model and property. It then notifies agent αt of the new
model m′ and property g′, and finally adds a change perception to the belief
base of agent αt corresponding to addition, removal or modification changes.
Modification Component Change
Change perceptions are handled by agents in the following cases. When compo-
nent ti of the component t ≡ f(t1, . . . , tm) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m is modified, a change
perception modified is issued by the engine to agent αti . In this case, the en-
gine first updates the component model and property to m′ti and g
′
ti respectively.
The engine updates the belief base Bti of the agent, replacing its model and
property beliefs with information of the new verification task model(m′ti) and
property(g′ti), respectively. The engine’s change perception triggers the belief
addition event +modified in the agent and is handled by the plan
+modified : true ← !verify ∧ !notify .
supplied by the agent planner. The agent proceeds to call the oracle to verify its
modified task, providing the agent with a new belief result(V ). Next, the agent
achieves the goal !notify to notify agent αt that re-verification is complete. The
plan
+!notify : true← send(t, !reverifyti). (12)
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communicates the !reverifyti achievement goal to agent αt. Agent αt attempts
to achieve this goal using the plan
+!reverifyti : true←− resultti ∧ −propertyti (13)
∧ send(ti, givep,Ai)
∧ send(ti, givev, Vi) ∧ !verify ∧ !notify .
which obtains the modified property a′i and updated verification result v
′
i from
αti . The !verify goal uses the updated assumptions function a
′ : P → V to
invoke the oracle where
a′(aj) =
{
v′i if aj = ai,
a(aj) otherwise,
and notifies agents that re-verification has occurred.
Addition Component Change
In the general case, the component term t = f(t1, . . . , tm) hasm sub-components.
The addition of the new component tm+1 to t is specified by the component term
t′ = f(t1, . . . , tm, tm+1). Mathematically, we define the substitution operation
S′ = S[f(t1, . . . , tm)/f(t1, . . . , tm, tm+1)] (14)
to replace instances of t with t′ in the component term representation S to obtain
S′. When the system representation is updated, the engine adds the change
perception add(tm+1) to agent αt’s belief base, triggering a belief addition event
that is handled accordingly by the plan
+add(T ) : true← create(T ) ∧ replan
∧ !verify ∧ !notify .
The action create(T ) invokes the agent planner to construct a new agent αtm+1
and assign it the verification task w associated with the new component tm+1.
Once constructed, the agent completes its initial achievement goal !verify . The
action replan described in the next section is used by αt to take into account the
added component. Once αt obtains new plans it re-verifies to take into account
the new component. The goal !notify ensures all relevant agents are notified.
Removal Component Change
A component ti is removed from t = f(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tm), resulting in a new com-
ponent term t′ = f(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tm). The term substitution operation
(14) is applied to S such that S′ = S[f(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tm)/f(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tm)]
replaces instances of t with t′ in S, forming the component term S′. When
the system representation is updated, the engine adds the change perception
removeti to agent αt’s belief base, triggering a belief addition event handled by
the plan
+removeti : true←− propertyti ∧ −resultti ∧ stopti
∧ replan ∧ !verify ∧ !notify .
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which removes agent αt’s beliefs regarding the verification result and property
obtained from agent αti . The action stopti terminates and removes agent αti
from the AVE. The agent plan replan requests new plans that enable αt to
reverify their verification task and notify all relevant agents.
Agent Evolution
Agent action replan requests advice from the planner after a change. The
planner modifies the agent’s plan library as follows. Given the component
term t′ obtained by adding or removing the sub-component term ti from t =
f(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tm), the agent planner constructs• a new !queryagen s plan body (5), adding or removing actions send(ti, givep,Ai)
and send(ti, givev, Vi) requesting agent αti ’s property and verification value.
This corresponds to constructing the assumption function in (6).
• a context rule (9), adding or removing propertyti(Ai) and resultti(Vi) as
belief requirements for verification,
• a verification plan body (10), adding or removing test goals ?propertyti(Ai)
and ?testti(Vi). The parameter listing in the oracle invocation is accordingly
updated to add or remove parameters Pi and Vi.
• a re-verification plan (13), adding and removing plans corresponding to sub-
components dependencies.
When the agent receives the new plans, the agent reinitialises and attempts
to achieve their initial verification goal.
Re-verification Policies
Plans (12) and (13) perform re-verification that essentially follow recently intro-
duced incremental verification techniques [15, 13] based on component depen-
dencies defined by the system’s architecture. By using a BDI-agent approach,
these techniques are extendable to generalised verification policies comprising
programmable agent behaviours to perform remedial actions taken in response
to component change. Agent behaviour can express policies to send conditional
notifications only when their component becomes non-compliant to requirements
after a change, perform verification steps involving other oracles, or notify other
agents specified by the application domain requirements.
4 A Compositional Approach to SMT
We instantiate AVE with an existing SMT-based technique. The following con-
cepts are defined in [15] and reproduced for completeness.
Component Models
To integrate an SMT verification service with the engine we defineM = P(Z)+,
such that each component term t is modelled as a finite subset Zt of variables
from the set Z inductively on the structure of component terms:
• Zci ∈ P(Z), for each basic component term ci such that models are pairwise
disjoint Zci ∩ Zcj = ∅, for i 6= j.
• Zf(t1,...,tm) = ∪mi=1Zti for each operation f ∈ Σ and component terms
t1, . . . , tm.
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Component Properties
Let P = F (Γ, Z) such that component requirements are quantifier-free first
order formulae over the signature Γ, defined inductively by the rules
φ ::=t1 = t2 | r1(t1, . . . , tn1) | · · · | rm(t1, . . . , tnm) |
¬φ1 | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2
where t1 and t2 are terms, and φ1 and φ2 are formulae.
We often display the variables that appear in a formula by writing φ(z) to
mean that the formula φ has at least one instance of the variables in the tuple
z = (z1, . . . , zp).
SMT Resolution
Satisfiability modulo theories represent a class of theoretical techniques and
practical tools that determine the satisfiability of a formula expressed in terms
of tests and operations in a signature Γ. An SMT technique smt : F (Γ, Z) →
[Z → V ] is applied to the formula φ(z) in order to compute and return an
assignment v : Z → V of values from the set V to the variables in z, such that
the formula is satisfied. In symbols, we write v |= φ(z) ⇐⇒ [[φ(z)]](v) = true
where v = smt(φ(z)). If no such v exists then the unsatisfiable assignment
u : Z → V is returned. We note the empty formula  is valid (i.e. satisfied by
all assignment mappings).
The requirements function R : C(Σ)→P supplied to the agent verification
engine associates each component term t with a logical formula φt such that
var(φt) ⊆ Zt where var(φt) is the set of variables in φt and Zt is the component
model of t. We use the inductive properties of component terms to compute
the conjunction φ = φt1 ∧ · · · ∧ φtm of formulae associated to the components
t1, . . . , tm of S. By resolving φ using smt, we get an assignment a : P → V of
values from V to variables in φ such that system requirements R are satisfied.
We also define the function mono : C(Σ) → F (Γ, Z) such that mono(t) is the
monolithic formula of t, by induction over the structure of component terms.
Let t be a component term in C(Σ).
Base case: for t ≡ ci the basic component ci, we have mono(ci) = φci .
Inductive step: for t ≡ f(t1, . . . , tm) with sub-components t1, . . . , tm and
operation symbol f ∈ Σ, we have mono(t) = φf(t1,...,tm) ∧ (∧mi=1mono(φti)).
Compositional SMT Resolution
As the component-based system S typically contains a large number of com-
ponents and requirements, resolving a monolithic formula mono(S) involves a
huge constraint problem and is generally unfeasible for a single agent to com-
plete during runtime. Instead, we describe a compositional approach based on
the results of [15, 16] which constructs smaller resolution steps to be carried
out independently. The solutions obtained in each step are combined to form a
solution for the monolithic formula.
The resolution of the conjunction φ1(y)∧φ2(z) of independent formulae (no
shared variables) may be decomposed into two smaller steps a1 = smt(φ1(y))
and a2 = smt(φ2(z)), combined using the operation ⊕ : [P → V ]2 → [P →
V ] such that (a1 ⊕ a2)(z) = a1(z) if z ∈ z and a2(z) otherwise. We can
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prove that a1 ⊕ a2 |= φ1(y) ∧ φ2(z) (cf. Lemma 4.1 [15]). We extend this
observation to n > 1 independent logical formulae φ1, . . . , φn and construct
an assignment v |= ∧ni=1φi through a sequence of independent resolution steps
v1 |= φ1, . . . , vn |= φn. (cf. Theorem 4.1 [15]).
The SMT Oracle
Compositional SMT resolution serves as the basis for instantiating the assume-
guarantee oracle ω specified by (1) to perform compositional SMT resolution.
The oracle accepts as input a verification task comprising
• mapping a : {φ1, . . . , φn} → {v1, . . . , vn} of independent logical formulae
in F (Γ, Z) to values in V representing assumptions such vi |= φi for φi ∈
dom(a) and vi ∈ range(a),
• g ∈ F (Γ, Z), independent of each formula in dom(a),
• model m = var(g)∪ (∪i∈{1,...,n}var(ai)), the union of the variable sets for g
and a1, . . . , an.
We model the oracle as the total function ω : W → V as
ω(m, g,a) = smt(g)⊕ (⊕ni=1vi) (15)
that performs smt resolution to compute an assignment of values in V to the
model variables in m that satisfies the conjunction g ∧ a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an of logical
formulae. Thus, we conclude ω(m, g,a) |= g ∧ (∧ni=1ai).
5 Case Study
We introduce an industrial control system to illustrate our agent-based verifi-
cation engine. Figure 2 depicts an item sorting system (ISS), typically used
to sort high volume item streams within systems such as airport baggage han-
dling and food packaging. Items are placed in an initial position by a robotic
arm. Horizontal and vertical pushers use sensors to detect items and then direct
them towards user-specified end-points. Additional robotic arms remove items
from the end-points. The system software is written using the IEC 61499 [17]
language, which enables component-based design where components contain
finitely nested networks of (sub) components. Figure 3 shows the architecture
of the ISS. The system S comprises components vert, horiz and robot, rep-
resenting the control programs for the vertical and horizontal pushers, and the
robotic arms, respectively. Each component has three sub-components labelled
from A to I.
Components of IEC 61499 programs execute on devices such as programmable
logic controllers (PLCs). Components deployed onto the same PLC communi-
cate using faster local mechanisms such as shared buffers. Components on
different PLCs communicate using networks like Ethernet. For the ISS, which
handles high item volumes, system speed can be significantly reduced if critical
path sub-components like communicating pushers execute on different PLCs.
Also, the ISS can be made more dependable by deploying multiple instances of
sub-components A− I across available PLCs, numbered 1 to p (p ≥ 2), accord-
ing to the following high-level requirements R:
R1 each component has 1 to 10 instances deployed
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Figure 2: An item sorting system
A CE E
vert
GF IH
robot
S
horiz
D
Figure 3: Architecture of the item sorting system
R2 A−C have at least 4 instances deployed
R3 G has exactly 3 instances on PLC 2
R4 H must not be deployed on PLC 1
R5 all instances of D, E and F are identically distributed
The deployment configuration problem determines a distribution of compo-
nent instances of the ISS S across p PLCs to satisfy the high-level requirements
R.
System Specification in AVE: We define a component signature Σ and ex-
press an algebraic specification of the system architecture depicted in Figure 3.
Let the set of component terms be denoted as C. We set the basic components
of the system A, . . . , I and define an operation symbol c : C × C → C. For the
ISS, we have the component term
S ≡ c(vert, c(horiz, robot)) (16)
where, vert ≡ c(A, c(B,C)), horiz ≡ c(D, c(E,F)) and robot ≡ c(G, c(H, I)).
Component models: To apply the compositional SMT resolution technique
described in Section 4 to the deployment configuration problem, we model sub-
components A, . . . , I by finite sets ZA, . . . , ZI of variables. E.g., A is modelled
by the set ZA = {Az1, . . . ,Azp} of integer-typed variables from the set Z such
that the assignment Azi = nmodels the deployment of n instances of component
A onto the ith PLC. By definition, we have the model ZS = Zvert ∪ Zhoriz ∪
Zrobot associated with the component term S, where Zvert = ZA ∪ ZB ∪ ZC,
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Zhoriz = ZD ∪ ZE ∪ ZF and Zrobot = ZG ∪ ZH ∪ ZI.
Requirements Specification We define a mapping φ : C(Σ) → F (Γ, Z) by
formalising requirements R1 - R5 of the ISS architecture as logical formulae
over integer-type variables to be associated with components of S. Let Γ be a
signature comprising sorts for integers and Boolean, symbols for the standard
arithmetic operations, equality and inequality predicates. Initially, we set φt =
, that signifies the case where component t is not constrained. Requirement R1
sets the range of deployed instances for each sub-component of S between 1 and
10, with non-negative number of instances over any PLC. For sub-component
A, we express this requirement as the formula
φ1A :=
p∧
i=1
Azi ≥ 0 ∧
p∑
i=1
Azi ≥ 1 ∧
p∑
i=1
Azi ≤ 10. (17)
Similarly, all other sub-components B− I are assigned formulae φ1B−φ1I respec-
tively. Requirement R2 further constrains the deployment, and is expressed as
φ2A :=
∑p
i=1 Azi ≥ 4. We add this formula to the existing formula for R1 by
assigning φA := φ
1
A∧φ2A. We assign simular formulae φB := φ1B∧φ2B and φC :=
φ1C ∧ φ2C for sub-components B and C. R3 is formalised as φ2G := (Gz2 = 4)
and we construct φG := φ
1
G ∧ φ2G, using the formula φ1G formalising R1 for
G. For R4 we specify φ2H := (Hz1 = 0) and add this formula to the existing
requirements by assigning φH := φ
1
H ∧ φ2H. Lastly, we formalise Requirement
R5 which states that the sub-components of D,E and F must have identical
distributions of instances across the PLCs. We define the formula
φvert :=
p∧
i=1
(Dzi = Ezi) ∧ (Fzi = Ezi) (18)
where the model for vert comprises variables from its sub-component models
ZD, ZE, and ZF.
6 Implementation and Simulation
We developed a generic multi-agent simulator of the agent verification engine
as a open-source Java application. The engine’s implementation is based on
Jason AgentSpeak [10]. Jason has a theoretical basis which is amenable to
our formal approach for system adaptation and has built-in, extensible support
for multi-agent system distribution over networks. We used Jason’s standard
architecture for agent perceptions, inter-communication and actions. The AVE’s
implementation comprises the following core classes
• RunTimeEnvironment<M,P,V> simulates perceptible component changes within
the system’s runtime environment and executes agent actions (M for models,
P for properties and V for verification results)
• Engine<M,P,V> maintains the system representation and compositional ver-
ification technique
• AgentPlanner<M,P,V> constructs agents and provides new plans after changes
occur.
• CompVerify, a compositional verification paradigm providing abstract meth-
ods add, modify and remove for updating the system’s algebraic specifica-
tion.
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αvert
αG(φG) αI(φI)αH(φH)
αrobot
αS
αhoriz(φD ∧ φE ∧ φF )
Figure 4: ISS Agent Tree
Table 1: An assignment mapping satisfying all ISS requirement in R for 2 PLCs.
αA αB αC αvert αG αH αI
vS A B C D E F G H I
z1 1 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 1
z2 3 0 2 1 1 1 3 1 0
Agent Verification Engine for the ISS: We instantiated AVE for the de-
ployment configuration problem for the ISS as follows. First, Z3CompVerify, a
concrete class utilising the compositional SMT approach described in Section 4
was developed. The oracle ω defined by (15) is implemented using the Microsoft
satisfiability modulo theories solver Z3 [18]. AVE was also provided with S, the
architecture (16) of the ISS, as well as a mapping φ : C(Σ) → F (Γ, Z) that
assigns logical formulae to components of the system.
When the engine receives these inputs, the agent planner constructs the
necessary agents that co-operate to solve the deployment configuration problem.
Figure 4 depicts a tree comprising ten agents in the set A constructed by the
agent planner as described in Section 3. Each node is labeled with the name of
the agent corresponding to a component in the ISS. The logical formulae to be
resolved by the agent using the oracle are written in parenthesis. The formula
φvert defined in (18) shares variables with its sub-component formulae φD, φE
and φF. None of these formulae can be resolved independently thus the engine
assigns the task of resolving φvert ∧ φD ∧ φE ∧ φF to agent αvert. The edges of
the tree denote communication links between agents in which queries, properties
and values are transmitted according to plans (5), (7) and (8) respectively.
Once the engine has been initialised, agents in A attempt to achieve their
verification goal. We consider this process for agent αA as follows. The agent
has initial beliefs model(ZA) and property(φA). It then attempts to achieve goal
!verify using plan (10) by invoking ω(ZA, φA, η) to obtain assignment vA =
{Az1 → 1,Az1 → 3}, storing the belief result(vA). It also attempts the
achievement goal !detect defined in (11) to sense changes in component A during
runtime.
The configuration problem is resolved when the result belief is stored by αS.
αS carries out the following steps for this purpose. αS first queries the agents
αvert, αhoriz and αrobot and forms the assumption function a : P → V such
that a(φvert) = vvert, a(φhoriz) = vhoriz, and a(φrobot) = vrobot. αS then
invokes the oracle vS = ω(ZS, , a), where ZS is the component model of S,  is
the empty formula. Finally, αS stores +result(vS) in its belief base.
Table 1 depicts the value vS obtained by the SMT process carried out by
the oracle. The agent’s belief represents one possible assignment mapping to
satisfy all requirements in R.
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Figure 5: Configuration using Compositional SMT resolution and AVE
Experimental Results
We evaluated the performance of AVE by running a series of experiments start-
ing with the ISS architecture shown in Figure 3 and subsequently increasing
the system size by five components at each step, corresponding to an increase
of 5 agents and 50 variables in the Z3 specification of the system requirements
(assuming 10 available PLCs). The experiments hence considered system sizes
containing between 10 and 60 agents. A standard PC running Windows 7 En-
terprise 64-bits with an Intel i7 2.1GHz Processor and 16 GB RAM was used
for the tests. We measured the time for αS to acquire the belief result(vS) and
compared it to the cumulative time across all oracle invocations, corresponding
to the time needed to complete minimal number of steps to resolve the deploy-
ment configuration problem using standard compositional SMT resolution. The
results of this experiment are presented in Figure 5. All runs completed under
7 seconds. For small system sizes, the difference in speed of the two approaches
is negligible. As the system grows with additional components, AVE benefits
from concurrent oracle invocations by the agents.
We also carried out the following experiments to evaluate the performance
of our implementation for re-configuration after a system change is perceived
by an agent.
1. Adding a Robotic Arm: The ISS requires an additional robotic arm to
pick up items from a new end-point and the runtime environment simulates the
addition of a new component R to the system. The component is modelled
by the variable set ZR and its requirements are formalised by the standard
logical formula φR = φ
1
R as defined in (17). The agent verification engine
performs the following steps. First, a substitution on the component term S is
performed, obtaining S′ ≡ S[robot/c(c(G, c(H, I)),R)] and add(R) is added
to αrobot belief base. Next, agent αrobot issues the action to create(R). The
agent planner then submits new plans to αrobot, who invokes the oracle with
assumptions from αG to αI and αR. Agent αR obtains a new belief of the
result. Finally, αrobot notifies αS, resulting in a new result belief for αS that
includes the new verification result.
Figure 6 shows AVE consistently took about 37 milliseconds to re-configure
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the system, ranging in size from 10 to 60 agents. In contrast, global reconfigu-
ration of the entire system took increasingly longer as system size increased.
2. Modifying Requirements: We considered updated requirements to change
the deployment of the pushers over available PLCs. Such updates may happen
often for the ISS, in order to react to changing item volumes and types. As
Figure 6 shows, the re-configuration effort grew from about 67 milliseconds to
110 milliseconds for systems sized from 10 to 60 agents. In contrast, a complete
re-configuration can take as much as nine times longer to reverify, requiring
1000 milliseconds to completely reverify the largest system containing 60 agents.
Experiments to compare re-verification time after an agent removal due to com-
ponent failure showed that on average it takes 58 ms for agent αS to obtain an
updated result belief, whereas global reconfiguration takes 897 ms on average,
for systems containing 10 to 60 agents.
7 Related Work
There have been many approaches to solve the system reconfiguration problem
that we used to demonstrate the agent verification engine. Various formal no-
tations [19, 20, 21, 22, 23] specify and verify component-based systems whose
architectures can evolve at run-time with the addition or removal of compo-
nents. We address a similar problem in this paper but by contrast, our work
delegates verification tasks to agents rather than handling them in a centralised
way. In [24], two configuration protocols for deploying a cloud application over
multiple virtual machines are proposed and verified using formal methods. In
contrast to our work, the protocols proposed in this article do not take into
account component failures and subsequent re-configuration actions. In [25],
a reconfiguration protocol is proposed that can handle any number of failures
during a reconfiguration. This protocol expects reconfiguration decisions to be
made before-hand, unlike our approach which uses agents to make reconfigu-
ration decisions based on changes in the system architecture, requirements, or
device availability. Another approach that incorporates agent technology is Lira
[26], a light-weight, agent-based reconfiguration engine. Each component in a
given distributed software system has a unique agent associated with it. An
agent handles reconfiguration requests for its associated component. RECoMa
[27] is a configuration manager can help find appropriate computer platforms
to deploy software agents of a multi-agent system. All available devices on
which available components can be deployed are treated as equal, each capable
of deploying the components allocated to it. However, our framework can be
extended to heterogeneous platforms by the use of requirements that specify
constraints on the device’s deployment.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a generic Agent Verification Engine in which agents observe
components and determine their compliance to system requirements using a
supplied compositional verification technique. Agents communicate verification
results such that validation of localised components infer validation of the entire
system. A key benefit of the approach is the inherently distributed nature of
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Figure 6: Running time of AVE versus full compositional verification
the agents constructed by the engine, providing a decentralised method to apply
compositional verification to large-scale component-based systems.
Future work includes extending the theoretical underpinnings of our ap-
proach. We defined the engine as a translation from an algebraic specification
of the system architecture to agent behaviours. BDI-agents were chosen to ex-
press re-verification behaviours since they have a rich logical framework [28] that
is required to prove the correctness of the agents constructed by the engine. Sec-
ondly, the engine can be extended to include agent interpretation of verification
results, forming instructions to be provided as input for actuators to affect the
environment in a way that component compliance is restored after a change.
Lastly, there is no end to the kinds of verification techniques to instantiate the
engine and solve domain specific problems from areas such as industrial control
systems or cloud computing technologies.
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